5 States Where Pandemic Stress Could Hurt CEOs’ Health

Link: https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2021/03/23/5-states-where-pandemic-stress-could-hurt-ceos-health/


The Great Recession had the mortality effect of increasing a typical CEO’s age by about 1.5 years.

Anti-takeover laws had the mortality effect of decreasing a typical affected CEO’s age by about 2 years.

The Great Recession made an affected CEO look an average of 1.2 years older, based on assessments by computers equipped with age-estimation software.

Author(s): Allison Bell

Publication Date: 23 March 2021

Publication Site: Think Advisor

CEO Stress, Aging, and Death

Link: https://www.nber.org/papers/w28550



We estimate the long-term effects of experiencing high levels of job demands on the mortality and aging of CEOs. The estimation exploits variation in takeover protection and industry crises. First, using hand-collected data on the dates of birth and death for 1,605 CEOs of large, publicly-listed U.S. firms, we estimate the resulting changes in mortality. The hazard estimates indicate that CEOs’ lifespan increases by two years when insulated from market discipline via anti-takeover laws, and decreases by 1.5 years in response to an industry-wide downturn. Second, we apply neural-network based machine-learning techniques to assess visible signs of aging in pictures of CEOs. We estimate that exposure to a distress shock during the Great Recession increases CEOs’ apparent age by one year over the next decade. Our findings imply significant health costs of managerial stress, also relative to known health risks.

Author(s): Mark Borgschulte, Marius Guenzel, Canyao Liu, Ulrike Malmendier

Publication Date: March 2021

Publication Site: NBER

Does Private Equity Investment in Healthcare Benefit Patients? Evidence from Nursing Homes

Link: https://www.nber.org/papers/w28474


The past two decades have seen a rapid increase in Private Equity (PE) investment in healthcare, a sector in which intensive government subsidy and market frictions could lead high-powered for-profit incentives to be misaligned with the social goal of affordable, quality care. This paper studies the effects of PE ownership on patient welfare at nursing homes. With administrative patient-level data, we use a within-facility differences-in-differences design to address non-random targeting of facilities. We use an instrumental variables strategy to control for the selection of patients into nursing homes. Our estimates show that PE ownership increases the short-term mortality of Medicare patients by 10%, implying 20,150 lives lost due to PE ownership over our twelve-year sample period. This is accompanied by declines in other measures of patient well-being, such as lower mobility, while taxpayer spending per patient episode increases by 11%. We observe operational changes that help to explain these effects, including declines in nursing staff and compliance with standards. Finally, we document a systematic shift in operating costs post-acquisition toward non-patient care items such as monitoring fees, interest, and lease payments.

Author(s): Atul Gupta, Sabrina T. Howell, Constantine Yannelis & Abhinav Gupta

Publication Date: February 2021

Publication Site: NBER